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ln the Supreine Court of the
State of Utah

THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs ..
OPAL JOHNSON, individually and
as Administratrix of the Estate of
Clyde W. Johnson, deceased,
Defendant and Respondent.

CASE
NO. 11159

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF CASE

Defendant, by counterclaim, is endeavoring to prevent
cancellartion of health and accidenrt insurance with life insurance coverage.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

Lower court held defendant was entitled to coverage
and awarded judgment against plaintiff.
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2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The affiiming of trial court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Statement of Facts of Appellant are essentially
accurate. However, it is not conceded that defendant answered questions falsely but that the plaintiff's agent testj.
fied that they were falsely answered. The Findings of
Fact of the trial court best state defendant's position and
are as follows:
"That on October 17, 1957, at the solicitation of the
plaintiff's agent, one Niles M. Wing, the defendant, Clyde
W. Johnson, deceased, did make application and receive a
Health and Accident policy from the plaintiff company, said
policy containing an incontestable provision when it had
been in effect for a period of two years; on the 2nd day of
February, 1960, at the solicitation of the same agent, and
upon being informed that he wa:s no longer eligible to con·
tinue the policy issued on October 17, 1957, said defendam
did purchase, on February 2, 1960, a Health and Accident
policy which, again, contained an incontestable provision
after having been in force and effect for a period of two
years; after the policy purchased on February 2, 1960, had
been in effect approximately five years, and at the urging
of the same agent for the plaintiff company, one Niles M.
·wing, this defendant did allow the previous policy to laµ;e
and before said policy had lapsed did acquire, through said
agent, on September 3, 1965, a new Health and Accident
policy which insured the life of Clyde W. Johnson in the
amount of $2,000.00 payable to the defendant Opal John·
son, the administratrix of his estate. Said policy also pro-
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vided medical and hospital benefits which were made payable to the insured or his estate, all as more fully appears
from the said policy of insurance.
That the application for insurance completed on the
3d day of September, 1965, was completed by the agent,
Niles M. Wing, and all answers inserted by him. The answers contained in Pavt II thereof, paragraphs 2 (a), (b),
(c), and (d), 'Have you or any person in your family been
treated for serious physical disorders or had been hospitalized during the post five years,' were false; that in fact the
application upon its face showed that the defendant, Opal
Johnson, had been hospitalized in 1959 for a bladder infection, and it was admitted by the plaintiff's agent, Niles M.
Wing, that he was in error in answering this section of the
application. Said answers were false in that the defendant, Clyde W. Johnson, had been afflicted with, prior thereto, a chronic heart disease which had been detected in
March of 1964. The defendant, Clyde W. Johnson, following his ,being told of said heart disease, had continued to
engage in his plumbing business upon a full time basis until shortly before open heart surgery in March of 1966, and
as a direct result of said surgery did die.
1

That in the policies issued hy the plaintiff company
to the said decedent, Clyde W. Johnson, in 1957 and 1960,
the following provisions were contained:
'Time Limit on Certain Defenses: (a) After two
years from the date a person becomes covered under
this Policy, no misstatements, except fraudulent misstatements, made by the appplicant in the application
for coverage of such person shall be used to void the
Policy or to deny a claim or loss incurred after the expiration of such two year period.
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( b) No claim for loss incurred with respect to any
person after two years from the date such person
berom~ covered under this Policy shall be reduced
or. .demed on the ground that a disease or physical con.
d }tlon not e~cluded from coverage by name or specific
description effective on the date of loss had existed
prior to the effective date of coverage of such person.'
That upon all three occasions, when the defendant,
Clyde W. Johnson, deceased, acquired policies from t:he
plaintiff company, it was pursuant to the solicitations and
urging of one Niles M. Wing, their agent and employee."
ARGUl\lENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING
THAT POLICY NO. WP2 510 001 WAS IN FORCE AND
EFFECT AT THE TllVIE OF THE DEATH OF INSURED.
Plaintiff should be estopped to deny coverage after
policies with same company in force for some eight years
and new policies substituted at urging of plaintiff's agent.
A.

It would appear unconcionable to allow plaintiff to deny coverage after eight years when changes of policies
were made at urging and request of plaintiff's agent. Th-

pedally so when the agent testified that the answers were
incorrect in other respects and that he personally did not
understand the meaning of the questions (TR. 51-52). Cer·
tainly if the plaintiff's agent didn't know the meaning of
the questions, the deceased cannot be deprived of coverage
because it is claimed he gave an erroneous answer.
When on the face of an application for insurance a
question appears to have b2en imperfectly answered, and
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the insurer issues a policy without further inquiry, it waives
the wont of imperfection in the answer.
See Mutual Insurance Co. vs. Berry 81 Ark. 92, 98 S.W.
693; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Insurance Assoc. v.
Farmer, 65 Ark. 581, 47 S.W. 850; Phoenix Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Raddin, 120 U.S. 190, 30 L. ed.
646, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500.

Also, an insurance company cannot itself make a mistake of fact in a contract and then claim a forfeiture against
the insured because of a misstatement.
Gray v. Stone, 102 Ark. 146, 143 S.W. 114; Dwelling
l-IPuse Insurance Co. v. Brodie, 52 Ark. 11, 4 L.R.A.
458, 11 S.W. 1016; Franklin Life Insurance Co. v. Galligos, 71 Ark. 295, 73 S.W. 102; Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Assoc. v. Farmer, 65 Ark. 581, 57 S.W. 850.
It is a well established precept of law that the Court
will make every effort to protect the interests of rthe insured as against the insurer by virtue of his having presumed to have had less knowledge as to the contents of
the policy and the interpretation thereof.

See Leon G. Pritchett v. Equitable Life and Casualty
Insurance Co., 18 Utah 2d, Page 279, 421 P. 2d 943.

B. The respondent is entitled to the coverage of Policy No. WP2 510 001 by virtue of the insured having had
coverage with the appellant without lapse since 1957.
The plaintiff, through their agent Niles M. Wing, sold
three separate policies to the defendant, Clyde W. Johnson,
deceased. The first policy dated October 17, 1957, was in
effect until the second policy was obtained on February 2,
1960. The second policy was in effect until November 8,
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1965, and in the interim, the same agent had induced the
defendant to pw·chase a new insurance policey on the 3rd
day of September, 1965, which was in effect until his death.
Therefore, the uncontested facts show that the defendant,
Clyde W. Johnson, deceased, was insmed with the same general type of policy from 1957 w1til his death. Plaintiff admits th<it in each policy there was an incontestable provision of a maximum of two years (Par. 11, Pre-trial Order).
This means that on the first two policies taken out by the
decedent, had they stayed in effect, that the plaintiff would
have no defense to any material misrepresentation as to
pre-existing health con<.litions.
This fact is the first basis upon which the defendant
contends that the plaintiff should be estopped. from asserting that the incontestable provision should n<Yt apply as of
the effective date of the policy taken out either on October 17, 1957, or February 2, 1960. It would appear to the
defendant to be tmconceionable to allow the plaintiff company, through its agent, to induce the deceased defendant
to change policies when he had a vested right and, according to their own declarations, apparently knew of a change
in his health condition. It is obvious that the defendant
would not jeopardize his po.sition which had, as I say, become a vested one, had he known that in doing so he would
be jeopardizing the security of his family.
In supporting such position, the defendant cites for
the Court's consideration 29 A,A.J. § 1127 which states:
"Where a company assumes outstanding policies of
the original insurer, agrees to be li.:lble Ln the sai_ne
manner as the original insurer, and delivers to the u1•
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7
sured a new certificate in lieu of the original, it has
been held that the period for defending against the
policy is regulated by the incontestability provisions
of the original policy."
See 110 A.L.R. 1139, 85 A.L.R. 240, 105 A.L.R. 997,

which annotations contain munerous cases which defendant
contends are pertinent.
See also Wood v. Cosmopolitan Insurance Co., 266 Ill.

App. 556, in which a policy was issued in 1926 containing
a one year incontestable provision Later the defendant

assumed the outstanding policy of the insured and agreed
to be liable in tile same manner. Dea1Jh occurred within
two years of taking the new policy and defendant raised
the defense of the two year incontestable provision, and
the Court held that the period of the first policy applied.
Point I B (2), Page 15 of appellant's brief is ridiculous. What he is saying is that if the applicant had a preexisting disease or physical condition and falsefied as to
this fact, that no matter how long the policy was in foree
the incontestable provision would not apply. I feel this
position is so absurd that it warrants no comment. The
terms of the policy speak for themselves in this regard.
See 29 A, A.J. § 1114.

CONCLUSION
The policy on which deceased was paying premiums at
time of death should be held to have been in force. Plaintiff company should be estopped to deny coverage when
their agent erroneously completed the apprication by his
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8
own adrnis.sion and, further, the incontestable provision of
previous policy should apply to the substituted policy.
Respectfully submitted,

HEBER GRANT IVINS
Attorney for Respondent
75 North Center
American Fork, Utah 8400:1
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